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Abstract—Blackouts in power grids typically result
from cascading failures. The key importance of the
electric power grid to society encourages further
research into sustaining power system reliability and
developing new methods to manage the risks of
cascading blackouts. Adequate software tools are
required to better analyse, understand, and assess
the consequences of the cascading failures. This paper
presents MATCASC, an open source MATLAB based
tool to analyse cascading failures in power grids.
Cascading effects due to line overload outages are
considered. The applicability of the MATCASC tool
is demonstrated by assessing the robustness of IEEE
test systems and real-world power grids with respect
to cascading failures.
I. INTRODUCTION
The electric power grid is essential for modern
society. The continuous availability and reliability
of the power grid is crucial for the daily life
routines of millions of people. However, large-
scale blackouts repeatedly occur [1], [2]. Blackouts
have a direct cost of tens of billions of dollars
annually [3]. Due to the strong interdependencies,
failures might also propagate into other critical
infrastructures such as telecommunications, trans-
portation, and water supply [4], [5], [6]. The key
importance of the electric power grid to society
encourages further research into sustaining power
system reliability and developing new methods to
evaluate and mitigate the risks of cascading black-
outs. Adequate software tools are required to better
analyse, understand, and assess the consequences
of the cascading failures in power grids.
Cascading failure is a sequence of dependent
failures of individual components that successively
weakens the power system [3]. The cascade of an
initial failure occurs in different ways, including
the instability of voltage and frequency, hidden
failures of protection systems, software, or oper-
ator error, and line overloads. Different modelling
studies focus on a small subset of these mecha-
nisms. This is a necessary and healthy approach
at this stage of the development of the field [7].
The authors in [8], [9] propose models having
approximate representations of protection, operator
actions and voltage collapse by deploying AC load
flow analysis, while the researchers in [10], [11],
[12] present models of cascading failures due to
line overloads deploying a DC load flow analysis.
Carreras et al. [10] represent the slow complex
dynamics of grid upgrade while Chen et al. [11]
model hidden failures of the protection system.
Although different modelling perspectives have al-
ready been proposed, no effort is devoted to make
a non-commercial tool available for researchers to
work with. This paper presents MATCASC, an
open source MATLAB based package to analyse
cascading failures due to line overloads in a power
grid. MATCASC simulates cascading line outages
rather than controlling and mitigating them. The
MATCASC tool is mainly intended to be used
for academic purposes, and to be extended to
incorporate also other aspects of cascading failures
in power grids. The open source MATCASC tool
provides a basis towards a more comprehensive
cascading failure analysis tool.
Section II models the concepts/components of
the cascading failures in power grids. Section III
introduces the architecture of the MATCASC
and elaborates on the main modules. Section IV
demonstrates the applicability of MATCASC via
use cases while Section V ends the paper with a
conclusions and suggestions for the future work.
II. MODELLING CASCADING FAILURES IN
POWER GRIDS
This section develops a model to simulate cas-
cading failures due to line overloads in power
grids by using the complex network approach.
This requires modelling a power grid as a graph,
estimating line flows across the grid, and maximum
line capacities, and modelling line protections.
A. Mapping the power grid topology to a graph
A power grid is a multiplex network that is com-
posed of three functional parts: generation, trans-
mission, and distribution. Power is provided from
ar
X
iv
:1
30
8.
01
74
v1
  [
ph
ys
ics
.so
c-p
h]
  1
 A
ug
 20
13
generation buses to distribution stations through
the transmission buses that are all inter-connected
via transmission lines. In a graph representation
of a power grid, nodes represent generation, trans-
mission, distribution buses, substations and trans-
formers, while links model the transmission lines.
All the parallel transmission lines in a single-line
diagram are represented by an equivalent single
link in a graph representation. Additionally, the
links in a graph representation are weighted by the
admittance (or impedance) value of the correspond-
ing transmission line.
B. Estimating line power flows: DC load flow
equations
Electric power flows in a grid according to
Kirchoff laws. Accordingly, the physical properties
of a grid including impedances, voltage levels
at each individual power station, voltage phase
differences between power stations and loads at
terminal stations control the power flow in the grid.
The power flow equations are the basic tool to
estimate the flow values for each component in
the network. AC power flow equations are non-
linear equations that model the flows of both active
and reactive powers. DC load flow equations are
a simplified and linearised version of AC power
flow equations considering only flow of active
power [13], [14]. This model deploys DC load
flow analysis to estimate the flow values across
the network rather than AC load flow equations
because AC load flow analysis may not converge
when the lines and generators trip and introduces
significant complexity in the model [15]. In the
AC model, the active power flow fij through a
transmission line lij connecting node i and node j
is related to the complex voltage at both nodes i and
j and the impedance of the line lij as follows [14]:
fij =
|Vi||Vj |
zij
sin(θij) (1)
where |Vi| is the voltage amplitude at node i, θij
is the voltage phase difference between node i and
node j, and zij is the impedance of transmission
line lij . The above non-linear equation is linearised
by the following assumptions:
• line resistance is ignored so that line
impedance equals line reactance zij ≈ xij ;
• voltage phase differences are very small so
that sin(θij) ≈ θij ;
• flat voltage profile.
By incorporating the above assumptions in
Eq. (1), the DC power flow equation is obtained:
fij =
θij
xij
= bijθij (2)
where bij is the susceptance of line lij . The en-
tire system can be modelled solely by using the
following linear equation:
Pi =
d∑
j=1
fij =
d∑
j=1
bijθij (3)
where Pi is the real power flow at node i and d is
the degree of node i. In terms of matrices, Eq. (3)
can be rewritten as:
P = Bθ (4)
where P is the vector of real power injections, θ
contains the voltage angles at each node, and B is
the bus susceptance matrix in which Bij = − 1xij
and Bii =
∑d
j=1−Bij . Since the losses in the
system are neglected, all the active power injec-
tions are known in advance. Hence, given the bus
susceptance matrix B, the voltage angles at each
node can be calculated directly by using:
θ = B-1P (5)
After obtaining the voltage angle values at each
node, the power flow values through each line can
be computed by using Eq. (2).
C. Estimating line capacities
The maximum capacity of a line is defined as
the maximum power flow that can be afforded
by the line. The flow limit of a transmission line
is imposed by thermal, stability or voltage drop
constraints [16]. In real world infrastructures, the
maximum capacity of a transmission line is con-
strained by cost [17]. This model assumes that the
maximum capacity of a line relates to its initial
load as follows:
Ci = αiLi(0) (6)
where Ci is the maximum capacity, Li(0) is the
initial load, and αi is the tolerance parameter of
line i.
D. Modelling line protection
In a power grid, transmission lines are protected
by circuit breakers. A circuit breaker trips a line
before the load of the line exceeds a certain thresh-
old level in order to prevent that the transmission
line is permanently damaged due to overloading.
For the sake of simplicity, this paper assumes a
deterministic model for line tripping mechanism.
A circuit breaker for line l trips at the moment the
load of the line l exceeds its maximum capacity:
|loading level| > 1.
This model does not consider the malfunctioning
of the protection devices also known as hidden
failures [11], in order not to confound the model
with details. While hidden failures contribute to
cascading failures in power grids, they can be
considered as having a second order impact to the
impact of the interconnection of topology [18].
III. THE ARCHITECTURE OF MATCASC
MATCASC provides a flexible environment to
simulate cascading failures due to line overloads
in electric power grids and to analyse the damage
after cascading failures occur. Its architecture, pre-
sented in Figure 1 with input-output relationships,
is built from several core modules: (a) estimating
load flow values across the grid, (b) estimating
the capacity matrix for the given configuration,
(c) determining the line threat, (d) simulating the
cascading effect in the grid and (e) quantifying the
damage in the grid due to the cascades.
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Fig. 1. MATCASC’s architecture
A. Input
In order to analyse the cascading failures in a
power grid, MATCASC requires (i) a grid structure
including the interconnection of the components
with their specific electrical properties, (ii) a load-
ing profile for the grid, (iii) a tolerance parameter
for transmission lines, and (iv) a removal strategy
to determine the line threat in the grid. (i) and (ii)
are provided as an input casedata file [19] while
(iii) and (iv) are directly given as input to the
corresponding modules.
B. DC line power flow and capacity estimation
The first step to analyse a cascading failure in
a power grid configuration to dispatch the power
over the grid. The DC Flow Estimation module
performs a DC load flow analysis to estimate line
flow values based on the modelling perspective
given in Sec. II-C. The output of this module is
a matrix including the flow values in the lines.
An element fij in the flow matrix indicates the
active power flow value from bus i to bus j. Having
obtained the flow values through each line, the
Capacity Determination module computes the line
capacity values by using the tolerance parameter
input and Eq.(6).
C. Line threat determination
The Line threat Determination module deter-
mines a line-to-be-removed to initiate a cascading
failures in the power grid depending on the removal
strategy input. The Line threat is the output. It is
a row vector in the form of [ij] indicating the line
between buses i and j. A removal strategy can be
either based on a random removal or based on a
targeted attack. MATCASC posses two different
attack options: (i) an edge-betweenness centrality
and (ii) an electrical node significance based attack.
The edge betweenness centrality [20] of a link
is a graph topological metric quantifying the topo-
logical centrality of a link in a network. Edge
betweenness centrality of a link l is defined as the
normalized number of shortest paths between any
pair of nodes passing through l.
The electrical node significance [21], [22] is
a contextual node centrality measure, specifically
designed for power grids. It is defined as the
amount of the outgoing power normalized by the
total amount of the distributed power in the grid:
δi =
Pi∑N
j=1 Pj
(7)
where Pi stands for total power distributed by node
i while N refers to number of nodes in the network.
In an edge-betweenness centrality based removal
strategy, the line with the highest betweenness is
marked as the line threat while in an electrical
node significance based attack, the most important
link of the node with the highest electrical node
significance is determined as the line threat.
D. Cascading line outages simulation
To simulate a cascading failure, the line-to-be-
removed is pruned from the topology. MATCASC
implements the removal of a line by setting the
admittance value of the corresponding line to zero
(i.e. impedance value to infinity) so that the line
flow is set to zero. This method models the effect
of a line outage appropriately and avoids the sin-
gularity of the admittance matrix that would result
from removing the outage. As a result of removal
of overloaded links, some parts of the grid may
disintegrate into separate islands. Disintegration
of the grid is checked at every cascading stage
whenever the overloaded lines are removed. As a
measure to assess the grid connectivity, the rank of
admittance matrix B is used. A full rank B indicates
a connected grid while a grid disintegration is
implied when B loses its rank.
Each island of the disintegrated network may
or may not have generation substations. If an
island is free of any generating source then it
is dead, marked red in Fig. 2 that depicts the
iterating procedure for the islanding process due to
the cascading effect per cascading stage t. Some
islands may not be affected completely by flow
redistribution, i.e. they still have a power gener-
ating source with enough capacity. These islands
still satisfy their demand and are marked green
in Fig. 2. All the intermediate islands in which
cascading failures continues are marked blue. The
tree structure shows how an island can undergo
changes in the coarse of cascade and disintegrate
into several islands some of which are functioning
and some are deeply affected by the cascade.
The Cascading Failure Simulation module still
iterates on all intermediate (blue) islands. The
electric power is redistributed. The redistribution of
the power flow may cause further successive line
overloads and removals in the grid. Consequently,
each intermediate island may result in an additional
group of islands and the model iterates on each
group of islands belonging to the same cascading
stage simultaneously. Fig. 2 illustrates the tree
structure encapsulating this procedure.
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Fig. 2. A tree structure depicting the logical depth of the model
and iterating procedure for islanding process
E. Quantifying the damage by cascading failures
After a cascading failure takes place in a power
grid, the damage in the grid is quantified empir-
ically by the metrics Power loss and Link loss.
Power loss is the fraction of the not-satisfied power
demand, while Link loss is defined as the fraction
of de-energized lines after a cascading failure oc-
curs in an electric power grid. A line is considered
to be de-energized if it is tripped by its protection
mechanism or if it is disconnected and isolated
from generators (e.g. remains in a dead island) after
the cascading failure.
IV. USE CASES
This section evaluates the robustness of differ-
ent test systems to exemplify for which purposes
MATCASC can be used. To demonstrate the appli-
cability of MATCASC, (i) the robustness of power
grids with respect to cascading failures is assessed
under targeted attacks, and (ii) the effectiveness of
different attack strategies is investigated.
A. Robustness assessment of power grids under
targeted attacks
For a cascading failure robustness analysis,
MATCASC requires the input data given in
Sec. III-A. The IEEE test systems and the real-
world Union for the Coordination of Transport of
Electricity (UCTE) network provides the required
information for a robustness analysis. Therefore,
IEEE 57, IEEE 118, and the UCTE network with
a summer loading profile are considered. For each
network, a tolerance parameter of 1.5 (i.e. a loading
level of 66%) is chosen. In these grids, a cascading
failure is triggered by targeted attacks. An attack
strategy based on the electrical node significance
metric is deployed. A targeted attack on these grids
results in a cascading failure, which relates directly
to the robustness of the grid.
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Fig. 3. Normalized satisfied power demand per stage of the
cascade in different power grids
The simulation results on the robustness assess-
ment of the test configurations in Fig. 3 suggests
that the real world UCTE network is the most
robust configuration against cascading failures due
to line overload under targeted attacks while the
IEEE 57 test system is the least robust configu-
ration. An attack on the IEEE 57 system based
on the electrical node significance results in a
loss of almost 75% of the total power demand.
Additionally, the initial failure propagates into the
grid very quickly, i.e. a small cascading depth. On
the other hand, in the UCTE case, an attack causes
that almost 50% of the total power demand can not
be served with a larger cascading depth. A larger
cascading depth gives more time to the network
operator to take preventive actions to better manage
the cascading failures.
B. Effectiveness assessment of cascade-induced at-
tack strategies in power grids
This subsection considers the IEEE 118 system
and the UCTE transmission grid with a sum-
mer profile to investigate their robustness under
different attack strategies. Three different attack
strategies are considered: (i) random attack, (ii)
betweenness based attack, and (iii) node signifi-
cance based attack. In each test grid a cascading
failure is initiated based on these attack strategies,
and simulated for different tolerance levels of the
components. When the cascade subsides, the sur-
vivability (i.e. robustness) of a grids is quantified in
terms of the fraction of energized links and satisfied
power demand. Fig. 4 and 5 show the result.
For a random attack scenario (see Figs. 4 and
5) IEEE 118 and UCTE grids have a comparable
level of robustness. For both grids, the relationship
between the tolerance level α and the survivability
of the grids is linear. As the tolerance level of
components in a grid increases the survivability
increases as well because the links are targeted
randomly. Like scale-free network, power grids are
significantly robust against random failures.
When attacking the networks based on between-
ness centrality, a transition occurs at a threshold
value of the tolerance parameter α, below which
the network collapses for any attack. In the UCTE
network, the transition occurs at a tolerance param-
eter value of 1.22 (i.e. a loading level of 82%),
while in the IEEE 118 test systems it occurs
at a tolerance parameter of 1.58 (i.e. a loading
level of 63%) suggesting that the UCTE summer
configuration is more robust compared to the IEEE
118 test system configuration.
In a node significance based attack scenario,
the damage is much larger for both networks.
Figs. 4 and 5 show that even at high values of
α the damage is significantly larger compared to a
random failure or a betweenness based failure. The
relationship between survivability and tolerance is
not strictly linear but a general long term trend is
visible suggesting that an increase in the tolerance
parameter of the components in a power grid,
results in a reduced damage.
The simulation results on the robustness levels of
different networks under different attack strategies
show that the purely topological measures (e.g.
betweenness centrality) underestimate the vulner-
ability of a power grid. A node significance based
attack highlights much more damage caused to a
power grid than theoretical centrality measures and
random removal. This result is in line with results
from Verma et al. [23] that assess the effectiveness
of different attack strategies.
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This paper introduces MATCASC, an open
source, non-commercial MATLAB package to sim-
ulate cascading failures in power grids. MATCASC
captures important characteristics of cascading fail-
ures including the line overloads and islanding
effect by deploying a DC load flow analysis. It
possesses mechanisms to deal with: (i) estimation
of line power flow, (ii) estimation of the line
capacities, (iii) offering different line removal op-
tions (e.g. a random removal or an attack-based
removal), (iv) simulation of cascading line over-
loads outages, and (v) quantification of the damage
due to the cascading failures. The applicability of
MATCASC is demonstrated by (i) assessing the
robustness level of IEEE test systems together with
the real world UCTE network, and (ii) assessing
the effectiveness of different attacks strategies on
power grids.
MATCASC is mainly intended for the academic
and research purposes. It is designed to be easily
(i) understandable and (ii) extendible. The former
feature of MATCASC enables the researchers to
understand and use the tool easily in their cascad-
ing failure analysis study. The latter feature offers
enough flexibility to extend it so that, ultimately,
the tool evolves to an open source comprehensive
cascading failure analysis tool capturing different
cascading failures aspects.
The future work will focus on incorporating
other important aspects of cascading failures such
as AC load flow analysis, the instability of fre-
quency and voltage, and human/operator behaviour.
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Fig. 4. Link Survivability with respect to changes in Tolerance of the nodes in the network for different attack strategies.
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Fig. 5. Demand Survivability with respect to changes in Tolerance of the nodes in the network for different attack strategies.
REFERENCES
[1] J. Conti, “The day the samba stopped,” Engineering
Technology, vol. 5, no. 4, 2010.
[2] “U.S.- Canada Power System Outage Task Force, Final
Report on the August 14th Blackout in the United States
and Canada: Causes and Recommendations,” 2004.
[3] R. Baldick et al., “Initial review of methods for cascading
failure analysis in electric power transmission systems,”
in IEEE PES General Meeting, 2008.
[4] M. Van Eeten, A. Nieuwenhuijs, E. Luiijf, M. Klaver,
and E. Cruz, “The state and the threat of cascading fail-
ure across critical infrastructures,” Public Administration,
vol. 89, no. 2, 2011.
[5] C. M. Schneider, N. Yazdani, N. Araujo, S. Havlin, and
H. J. Herrmann, “Towards designing robustn coupled
networks,” Scientific Reports, vol. 3, 2013.
[6] S. V. Buldyrev, R. Parshani, G. Paul, H. E. Stanley, and
S. Havlin, “Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdepen-
dent networks,” Nature, vol. 464, no. 7291, Apr. 2010.
[7] M. Vaiman et al., “Risk assessment of cascading outages:
Methodologies and challenges,” IEEE Transactions on
Power Systems, vol. 27, no. 2, 2012.
[8] D. S. Kirschen, D. Jayaweera, D. P. Nedic, and R. N.
Allan, “A probabilistic indicator of system stress,” IEEE
Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 19, 2004.
[9] R. Hardiman, M. Kumbale, and Y. Makarov, “An advanced
tool for analyzing multiple cascading failures,” in Int.
Conf. on Prob. Methods Applied to Power Systems, 2004.
[10] B. A. Carreras, V. E. Lynch, I. Dobson, and D. E.
Newman, “Complex dynamics of blackouts in power
transmission systems,” Chaos, vol. 14, 2004.
[11] J. Chen, J. S. Thorp, and I. Dobson, “Cascading dynamics
and mitigation assessment in power system disturbances
via a hidden failure model,” International Journal of
Electrical Power Energy Systems, vol. 27, no. 4, 2005.
[12] H. Liao, J. Apt, and S. Talukdar, “Phase transitions in the
probability of cascading failures,” in Electricity Transmis-
sion in deregulated markets, 2004.
[13] J. J. Grainger, J. Stevenson, and D. William, Power System
Analysis. McGraw-Hill, 1994.
[14] D. Van Hertem et. al, “Usefulness of dc power flow for
active power flow analysis with flow controlling devices,”
in IEEE Conf. on AC and DC Power Transmission, 2006.
[15] Z. J. Bao, Y. J. Cao, G. Z. Wang, and L. J. Ding, “Analysis
of cascading failure in electric grid based on power flow
entropy,” Physics Letters A, vol. 373, 2009.
[16] J. D. D. Glover and M. S. Sarma, Power System Analysis
and Design, 3rd ed. Brooks/Cole Publishing Co., 2001.
[17] A. E. Motter and Y.-C. Lai, “Cascade-based attacks on
complex networks,” Phys Rev E, vol. 66, 2002.
[18] D. Pepyne, “Topology and cascading line outages in
power grids,” Journal of Systems Science and Systems
Engineering, vol. 16, 2007.
[19] R. Zimmerman, C. Murillo-Sanchez, and R. Thomas,
“Matpower: Steady-state operations, planning, and analy-
sis tools for power systems research and education,” Power
Systems, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 26, no. 1, 2011.
[20] P. Van Mieghem, Performance analysis of communications
networks and systems. Cambridge University Press, 2006.
[21] Y. Koc¸, M. Warnier, R. E. Kooij, and F. Brazier, “A robust-
ness metric for cascading failures by targeted attacks in
power networks,” in Proceedings of the IEEE Conference
on Networking Sensing and Control, 2013.
[22] Y. Koc¸, M. Warnier, R. E. Kooij, and F. M. Brazier, “An
entropy-based metric to quantify the robustness of power
grids against cascading failures,” Safety Science, vol. 59,
2013.
[23] T. Verma, W. Ellens, and R. Kooij, “Context-independent
centrality measures underestimate the vulnerability of
power grids,” Int. Journal of Critical Infrastructures, 2013.
